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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Most boards of public companies have learned to live comfortably 
with audit committees, nominating committees, and compensation 
committees. An increasing number of companies are now also creating 
risk-management committees. This Essay explores the early stages of 
development of yet another board-level committee:  the sustainability 
committee. The Essay posits several advantages to having a board-level 
sustainability committee and identifies possible sources of pressure for the 
creation of more such committees. It also suggests some of the 
disadvantages of sustainability committees and cautions against cosmetic 
governance reform. By examining what we know today (and can imagine 
tomorrow) about sustainability committees, this Essay sets a baseline for 
future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The norms of corporate governance derive from many sources. A wide 
range of players, from state courts to institutional investors and from the 
U.S. Congress to the Department of Justice, have all weighed in with, 
what they claim to be, corporate governance “best practices.”1   
The concept of environmental sustainability, too, derives from many 
sources. Advocates of some version of the concept now range from the 
United Nations to traditional environmental advocacy groups and from 
multinational investment banks to interest groups like CERES.2 
Companies as diverse as Wal-Mart, Nike, General Electric, and Dell 
Computers have all staked a claim to leadership in sustainability 
practices.3 While there may be little consensus on what we mean by the 
term “sustainability,”4 more and more companies are embracing the 
language, if not the substance, of the idea. 
This Essay examines the small corner of the universe where corporate 
governance and environmental sustainability meet.5 Though most public 
                                                 
1 See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 794-95 (2008).  
2 See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM. 
& MARY ENV. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 293-94, 296 (2007) (tracing the involvement of 
these and other groups in developing sustainability norms).  
3 See id. at 300; see also Sindya N. Bhanoo, Products That Are Earth-and-Profit 
Friendly, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/ 
business/energy-environment/12sustain.html.  
4 As good a definition as any comes from Patricia Werhane: “Environmental 
sustainability involves protecting the environment, preventing further harms to nature, 
cleaning up pollution and other harmful emissions, conserving and recycling, maintaining 
the ecosystem, improving the environment, and/or restoring the ecosystem to a former, a 
pristine or pre-human condition.” Patricia H. Werhane, Note on Environmental Sustain 
ability, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908136 (last visited Feb. 24, 
2011). Another, more specific description of “sustainability” is: 
In its most utopian form, [sustainability] envisions a world in which all 
products are made from natural materials and are 100 percent reusable, 
recyclable or biodegradable, never ending up in landfills. At its most 
pragmatic, it is mainly about cutting costs–by reducing waste, selling 
recyclable components and reusing byproducts like rubber or plastic to 
create a new product. For a large company, this can mean millions of 
dollars in annual savings.  
Bhanoo, supra note 3. 
5 This is a largely unexplored space: 
Despite the extensive body of literature available on corporate 
governance and sustainability as separate areas of research, minimal 
attention has been paid to the interaction between the two. In particular, 
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companies “are still at the early stage of developing an integrated, 
enterprise-wide sustainability program,”6 an increasing number of those 
companies are involving their boards of directors in the process. The 
board, of course, serves as the fulcrum between expression of an ideal and 
execution by managers. The board usually achieves its goals by 
distributing its work among committees.7 
Some of today’s boards assign directors not only to audit committees, 
nominating committees, compensation committees, and (a growing 
number of) risk management committees, but also to board-level 
committees tasked in whole or in part with focusing on environmental 
issues.8 Nevertheless, according to The Conference Board, most public 
companies “still lack the structural framework to enable proper director 
oversight [of environmental activities].”9 
There is a history to board involvement in environmental matters. 
Early board-level committees were known, generally, as “environmental 
affairs” or “environmental policy” committees.10 These committees often 
were formed following a scandal, a lawsuit, or Congressional attention to 
a particular industry or practice.11 Their focus was mostly on legal 
compliance and the creation and oversight of monitoring programs; their 
real purpose, however, was to make a convincing showing that directors 
and senior management were at least aware of their companies’ 
environmental impact.12 
Today’s environmental committees increasingly are becoming known 
as “sustainability committees.”13 These committees, unlike their 
predecessors, are not the offspring of scandals or lawsuits, nor are they a 
                                                                                                                         
there is limited knowledge of the role performed by the board of 
directors in designing, endorsing, and overseeing the implementation of 
a corporate sustainability program. 
See Matteo Tonello, Sustainability in the Board Room, THE CONFERENCE 
BOARD 1, 1-2 (2010). 
6 Id. at 7. 
7 Id.  
8 According to the Wall Street Journal, as of 2008, 25 percent of Fortune 500 boards 
had some board committee specifically addressing environmental issues. Joann S. Lublin, 
Environmentalism Sprouts Up on Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121840356252128043.html. A 2010 survey 
by The Conference Board found that 21.6 percent of respondents assigned sustainability 
issues to a dedicated board committee. Tonello, supra note 5, at 7. 
9 Tonello, supra note 5, at 1.  
10 See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 959, 992 (1999) (discussing several such committees). 
11 Id. at 1005-06. 
12 Id. at 992. 
13 See infra notes 14-20. 
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response to any pressing threat of legislation.14 Rather, these committees 
reflect a conscious decision to devote board-level resources to 
sustainability issues, in part because sustainability practices may translate 
into decreased costs and increased profits, and also in part because 
sustainability issues are a growing piece of the corporate branding 
equation.15  
Today, sustainability committees can be found not only in extractive 
industries,16 but also in service industries,17 utility companies,18 real estate 
companies,19 paper manufacturers,20 plastics manufacturers,21 and various 
                                                 
14 There are some recent federal regulations that might foster growth of sustainability 
committees. First, the SEC recently announced a requirement for enhanced disclosure on 
risk management practices at the board level (for example, Regulation S-K Item 407(h)). 
See N. Kathleen Friday et al., The Board’s Role in Risk Oversight: A Survey of Recent 
Proxy Statement Disclosures, 24 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2, 2 (2010). 
Second, the SEC also recently provided guidance supporting enhanced disclosure on 
climate change issues. See Commission Guidance Regarding Climate Change, 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 211, 231, 241 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf. 
See also Tonello, supra note 5, at 15-16 (“Experts expect the Commission’s next move 
will be to officially mandate wide-ranging sustainability disclosure.”).   
15 Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, supra note 10, at 992. 
16 See GRYPHON-GOLD CORP., PROXY STATEMENT, available at  http://www.gryphon 
gold.com/main/annualreports; GOLD STAR RESOURCES, LTD., COMMITTEE CHARTER, 
available at http://www.gsr.com/Investment/Corporate_Governance/CorpCommittee.asp;  
CENTURY ALUMINUM CO., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://investor.shareholder 
.com/cenx/annuals.cfm; ALCOA, INC., COMMITTEE CHARTER,  available at 
http://www.alcoa .com/global/en/about_alcoa/corp_gov/Public_Issues_Committee.asp; 
SILVER STANDARD, INC., GOVERNANCE REPORT, available at http://www.silvers 
tandard.com/company/governance/bcc/index.php?content_id=18; ALPHA NATURAL RES-
OURCES, INC., COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at http://www.alphanr.com/corporate 
gov/committeecharters/she/Page/FullTextofSafetyHealthEnvironmentalandSustainabil-
ity.aspx; WEYERHAEUSER, COMMITTEE REPORT, available at http://www.weyerhaeuser 
.com /Sustainability/Directors/Responsibility. 
17 See INT’L MED. STAFFING, PURE SPECTRUM LIGHTING, INC., PROXY STATEMENT, 
available at http://www.psruir.com/sec-filings/. 
18 See PNM RES., INC., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.pnmresources 
.com/investors/documentdisplay.cfm?DocumentID=5604.  
19 See PROLOGIS, PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://ir.prologis.com/reports/ 
2008SustainabilityReport/report_guide.cfm; BOSTON PROPERTIES, INC., PROXY STATE-
MENT, available at http://ir.bostonproperties.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=120176&p=irol-
proxy. 
20 See KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP., COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at http://www.kim 
berly-clark.com/aboutus/sustainability.aspx.  
21 See SPARTECH CORP., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.spartech 
.com/Spartech2009_AnnualReport.pdf. 
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consumer product companies.22 Indeed, sustainability committees are 
popping up all over. 
Some of the companies that have created board-level sustainability 
committees may, of course, be playing a public relations game. By 
invoking “sustainability” rather than merely “compliance,” they may be 
pouring old wine into a new bottle. On the other hand, the emergence of 
sustainability committees across a range of industries may reflect a 
genuine and growing commitment to at least some conception of 
environmental sustainability. Only time will tell. 
This Essay will unfold as follows: First, it will explore what we know 
today about U.S. board-level sustainability committees.23 Then, it will 
consider the values served by assigning responsibility for sustainability 
issues to a board-level committee: (1) it stimulates high-level attention to 
the goal(s) of sustainability; (2) it encourages competent oversight of in-
house sustainability functions; (3) it provides a focal point for resource 
allocation decisions; (4) it emphasizes the notion that environmental 
compliance is not a sufficient corporate goal–something more aspirational 
may be appropriate; (5) it fosters education of committee members, often 
leading to “missionary work” both in and outside of the corporation; and 
(6) it helps in branding a corporation as a moral leader.24   
The Essay will then examine the driving forces that might promote the 
creation of more sustainability committees and elevate the practice from a 
handful of companies to hundreds or thousands. These driving forces 
include: (1) state corporate law; (2) federal securities law; (3) NYSE 
listing requirements; (4) consensus-based “best practices” for American 
corporations; (5) shareholder demand from the social investment sector; 
(6) shareholder demand in the form of shareholder proposals; (7) the 
imposition of governance changes in the settlement of securities class 
actions or SEC enforcement litigation; and (8) norm entrepreneurship by 
corporate CEOs.25   
 
  
                                                 
22 See FORD MOTOR CO., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.ford.com/ 
microsites/proxy-statements; Coca Cola Enter., Inc., Committee Charter, available at 
http://ir.cokecce.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117435&p=irolgovCommittee&Committee=846. 
23 See infra, Part I. 
24 See infra, Part II. 
25 See infra, Part III. 
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I. BOARD-LEVEL SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES IN 2010 
 
The decision to create a sustainability committee, like the decision to 
create any board-level committee, represents a deliberate choice about the 
optimal use of directors’ time and energy. An increasing (though still 
minute) portion of the United States corporate universe is now deciding 
that sustainability committees are a necessary component of their 
corporate governance structure.    
 
A. Committee Charters and Goals 
 
Sustainability committee charters vary and are currently evolving. 
Some companies, like Ford Motor Co., are both transparent and specific in 
their description of their committee’s objectives and tasks: 
 
To fulfill its responsibilities and duties, the Sustainability 
Committee shall: 
 
(1) Assist management in the formulation and implementation of 
policies, principles and practices to foster the sustainable growth of the 
Company on a world-wide basis. “Sustainable Growth” means the 
ability to meet the needs of present motor vehicle customers while 
taking into account the needs of future generations. “Sustainable 
Growth” shall also encompass a business model that creates value 
consistent with the long-term preservation and enhancement of 
financial, environmental and social capital. 
 
(2) Assist management in the formulation and implementation of 
policies, principles and practices to permit the Company to respond to 
evolving public sentiment and government regulation in the area of 
motor vehicle and stationary source emissions, especially in the area of 
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy and CO2 regulation. 
 
(3) Assist management in setting strategy, establishing goals and 
integrating sustainability into the daily business activities across the 
Company. 
 
(4) Review on a continuing basis new and innovative technologies 
that will permit the Company to achieve sustainable growth and 
Company actions to protect those technologies. 
 
(5) Review on a continuing basis partnerships and relationships, 
both current and proposed, with customers and others that support the 
Company's sustainable growth. 
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(6) Review on a continuing basis the Company’s communication 
and marketing strategies relating to sustainable growth.26 
 
Other companies are, at best, obfuscatory in describing the goals of 
their sustainability committees.27 Some, though not all, post their 
committee charters on their websites.28   
A recent survey by The Conference Board reveals an important feature 
of many sustainability initiatives, including the creation of board-level 
sustainability committees: many companies simply have no idea what they 
mean by “sustainability.” That is, when asked “how does your company 
define sustainability?” 32.4 percent of the respondents answered “we 
avoid definitions and focus on actions.”29 Where that is the case, the work 
of sustainability committees may cover a lot of ground. Or these 
committees–with no goals to guide them–may achieve little of lasting 
importance. One important task for researchers will be to track the 
performance both of companies that define and articulate their 
sustainability objectives and those companies that do not. 
 
B. Expertise, Information, and Accountability 
 
An inevitable issue with the creation of a new board-level committee 
is identifying who among the directors has either the interest or the 
expertise to be a useful committee member. Surely, some unwilling or 
unsuitable directors have been conscripted. 
A related issue is information flow to the committee members. The 
2010 Conference Board survey found that directors’ primary source of 
information to expand their knowledge of sustainability issues and to stay 
                                                 
26 FORD MOTOR CO., CHARTER OF THE SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, available at http://www.ford.com/doc/corpgov_sustainability_committee 
_charter.pdf.  
27 See, e.g., CENTURY ALUMINUM CO, PROXY STATEMENT, available at http:// 
investor.shareholder.com/cenx/annuals.cfm (“The Health, Safety and Sustainability 
committee (the HSS Committee) was formed in 2008 to assist the board with regard to 
oversight of Century’s policies and management systems with respect to health, safety, 
and sustainability matters.”). 
28 See, e.g., SYSCO CORP., CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE CHARTER, 
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SYY/854834918x0x234923/ b50417 
fe-221c-451e-82ced9894b229a83/Corporate_sustainability_committee_charter_Sept_ 
2008.pdf; PNM RESOURCES, PUBLIC POLICY AND SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE 
CHARTER, available at http://www.pnmresources.com/investors/documentdisplay.cfm? 
DocumentID =5604; PROLOGIS, SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/PLD/854844087x0x281671/49faa944-889d-4376 
-a19a-d26944 87f0b7/SUSTAINABILITY _COMM ITTEE_CHARTER.pdf. 
29 Tonello, supra note 5, at 9. 
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abreast of competitive developments is, as is the case with most other 
corporate matters, reports from senior executives.30 This means directors 
must either come to the committee with pre-existing knowledge, do their 
own due diligence in developing expertise, or rely–perhaps excessively–
on what the CEO and senior executives tell them. We understand that, in 
fact, directors rarely do independent due diligence: “[D]irectors almost 
never avail themselves of those additional sources (including peer-
company benchmarks, securities analyst reports, director education 
programs, and outside consultants) that would enable them to critically 
verify and analyze any internally produced information on these 
matters.”31 
Yet a third issue for new committees, apart from acquiring expertise, is 
figuring out how to recognize failure and measure success. In the 
Conference Board survey, 38.2 percent of respondents reported they “do 
not currently have a system in place for measuring progress made in their 
social and environmental activities and 32.4 percent do not assess the 
impact of such activities on the organization’s financial performance.”32 
Importantly, too, more than 60 percent of the survey’s respondents 
reported “they do not embed sustainability-related metrics into their top-
executive compensation policy.”33 
 
C. Effectiveness and Impact 
 
Even where board-level sustainability committees have the right 
people and give those people the right tools, these committees still may 
fail to protect the company’s interests. A vivid example is BP, which 
“appears to have done everything right” in assigning environmental issues 
to its board of directors.34 The board-level Safety, Ethics, and 
Environment Assurance Committee (SEEAC) was charged with ensuring 
that BP met its goal of “no accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to 
the environment.”35 Although it had reviewed critical reports on the safety 
                                                 
30 Id. at 7. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 10-11. 
33 Id. at 11. 
34 Geoff Colvin, Who’s to Blame at BP The Board, FORTUNE, July 28, 2010, 
http://geoffcolvin.com/fortune_articles/article/whos-to-blame-at-bp-the-board/. 
35 Id. The specific charge of the SEEAC Committee included (a) reviewing “the 
processes adopted by the executive management to identify and mitigate significant non-
financial risks and receive assurance that they are appropriate in design and effective in 
implementation,” (b) “monitoring and obtaining assurance that the management or 
mitigation of significant BP risks of a non-financial nature is appropriately addressed,” 
(c) reviewing material to be placed before shareholder which address BP’s 
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of BP’s projects, the SEEAC apparently ignored the message. That is, the 
SEEAC was aware of pervasive safety problems throughout BP’s North 
American operations and also was aware that the mechanisms for 
informing the board of these problems were “dysfunctional.”36   
We know now that the Committee’s efforts were wholly inadequate to 
anticipate or avoid the human and financial calamity arising out of the 
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon in April, 2010.37 In a shareholder’s 
derivative action filed shortly after the explosion on the drilling platform, 
plaintiffs described the directors’ conduct as follows: 
 
Defendants’ gross mismanagement of BP has severely damaged what 
was once a valuable corporate franchise. They have deliberately 
refused to take steps necessary to ensure the Company’s compliance 
with legally required safety rules and environmental safeguards, instead 
preferring to risk the safety of BP’s workers and the well-being of their 
families in the pursuit of increased profits.38…. The conduct of BPs 
directors and officers complained of herein involves a knowing and 
culpable violation of their fiduciary obligations, the absence of good 
faith on their part, and a reckless disregard for their duties to the 
Company and its shareholders which the directors and officers were 
aware or should have been aware posed a risk of serious injury to the 
Company.39 
 
There are reasons, of course, for failures like this. Outside directors 
work only part-time, are not provided staff, and often, even within the 
board, face competing priorities. The second-tier committees–those 
committees that deal with issues other than finance, governance, 
succession, and high-profile crises–probably fall far down the board’s 
agenda and may not command the face-time with the full board necessary 
                                                                                                                         
environmental, safety and ethical performance and making recommendations to the board 
about their adoption and publication,” (d) “reviewing BP’s internal control systems as 
they relate to non-financial risk,” and “reviewing reports on the group’s compliance with 
its code of conduct and on the employee concerns programme.” BP ANNUAL REPORT 
AND ACCOUNTS 77 (2009). 
36 Colvin, supra note 34 (quoting the testimony of corporate governance activist 
Robert A. G. Monks). 
37 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, 
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14 (“The BP spill is by far the world's 
largest accidental release of oil into marine waters….”). 
38 Complaint at 5 ¶ 11, Pickett v. Hayward, No. 9809041 (Alaska Ct. App. May 20, 
2010) (verified shareholder derivative complaint for intentional and negligent breach of 
fiduciary duty, abuse of control, and mismanagement). 
39 Id. at 16-17 ¶ 43. 
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to achieve the committees’ goals. The members of these committees may 
also, like any group, fall prey to group-think.40   
 
D. Corporate Resistance to Sustainability Committees 
 
It is curious, perhaps, that while some American companies are 
voluntarily creating board-level sustainability committees, others are 
fiercely resisting doing so. At Apple, Inc., for example, the 2010 proxy 
statement included a shareholder proposal that the company amend its 
bylaws to establish a board-level Committee on Sustainability.41 Apple’s 
management argued against adoption, in part because, according to Apple, 
the company already was doing more than any other company in the 
electronics industry to pursue sustainability goals.42 Intel successfully 
opposed a similar proposal at its annual meeting in April, 2008.43 
The Intel story, however, gets more interesting. In 2010, “under 
pressure from activist investors,” Intel announced that it had altered its 
corporate governance structure.44 
 
Specifically, as of March 10, 2010, Intel’s corporate governance and 
nominating committee charter requires that the committee “… 
review(s) and report(s) to the Board on a periodic basis with regard to 
matters of corporate responsibility and sustainability performance, 
including potential long and short term trends and impacts to our 
business of environmental, social and governance issues, including the 
company's public reporting on these topics.”45 
 
The emergence of sustainability committees, incidentally, has given 
rise to a predictable form of entrepreneurship. For instance, one distance-
learning website now promises to “certify” members for sustainability 
committees for only $397.46   
                                                 
40 See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board:  The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2003) (discussing the perils of groupthink and its role in the 
Enron debacle). 
41 Apple Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 54 (Feb. 25, 2010) (Shareholder 
Proposal No. 7), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/0001193 
12510013030/ddefr14a.htm. 
42 Id. at 54-55. 
43 Ambrose McNevin, Intel Rejects Call for Sustainability Committee, THE INQ-
UIRER, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1004991/intel-rejects-call. 
44 Tonello, supra note 5, at 17. 
45 Id. 
46 Distance Learning Online Certification Program, Certified Member of the 
Corporate Sustainability Committee of the Board of Directors, http://www.members-of-
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II. WHY SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES MIGHT MATTER 
 
Notwithstanding the recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in the Citizens United case,47 corporations have limited means of 
self-expression. One way a corporation can speak, however, is through its 
allocation of resources; particularly the limited resources of its outside 
directors. When a company assigns responsibility, say, for approving 
charitable contributions or political donations to a board-level governance 
committee, it is saying something about its institutional values and the 
board’s willingness to be held accountable for controversial corporate 
decisions.48 When a company establishes a board-level risk management 
committee, it is saying much the same thing: we take risk seriously, we 
have escalated it to the board level in order to maximize the attention and 
oversight that is given to the topic, and we want to centralize and 
professionalize this oversight rather than diffusing it across the entire 
board.49    
Choosing to create a sustainability committee (or a committee with 
comparable purposes but a different name) also sends a message. Indeed, 
the creation of such a committee is a signaling device that sustainability is 
a corporate priority. Creating a sustainability committee provides (some) 
evidence that a company is committed to performance that goes beyond 
mere compliance with existing and projected environmental laws. It can 
and does add flesh to those (ubiquitous) corporate mission statements that 
identify sustainability as one of a company’s key objectives. 
The creation of a sustainability committee–indeed the creation of any 
board-level committee–reflects the belief that that its members will 
develop and employ valuable competencies: knowledge of the larger 
environment in which the subject matter is situated and knowledge 
regarding issues the company may face (for example, sustainable 
manufacturing practices or preparedness for climate change) that the full 
board may lack; knowledge of the technologies required to achieve 
sustainability goals; knowledge of the language and metrics by which 
sustainability is assessed; a sense of the range of possible short-term and 
                                                                                                                         
the-boardassociation.com/Distance_Learning_for_the_Sustainability_Committee_ 
of_the_Board.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011). 
47 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876 (2010). 
48 See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities, and the 
Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1997) (advocating that corporate 
philanthropy be made a board-level agenda item). 
49 See generally E. William Bates, II & Robert J. Leclerc, Boards of Directors and 
Risk Committees, 17 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR. 15 (2009) (considering the 
ramifications of risk committees). 
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long-term sustainability goals and (at least in general) the pathways 
necessary to achieve those goals; an understanding of the resources and 
competencies currently within the company that can advance sustainability 
goals; an understanding of the company-specific levers required to 
activate people and resources; and a company-specific ability to move 
ideas and proposals through the chain of command.   
As we have seen, many of these competencies are still missing on 
corporate environmental committees.50 Still, a well-functioning 
committee, led by a competent chair, can with effort achieve many, if not 
all, of the objectives for which the committee was created.    
Beyond developing board-level expertise, there may be other benefits 
that arise from the creation of a sustainability committee. First, a 
sustainability committee (like any other special subject committee) is 
likely to be more “nimble” than the whole board in identifying trends and 
events.51 Second, a committee may foster cross-committee synergies–a 
director who serves simultaneously on the Governance Committee and the 
Sustainability Committee, for example, may see the dynamics of CEO 
succession in a different light than others who lack the dual committee 
experience.52 
Third, sustainability committees offer a particularly good opportunity 
for the exercise of the “advising” function by outside directors.53 When 
serving on a sustainability committee, outside directors may import good 
ideas that have not bubbled up internally, but nevertheless may be ripe for 
exploitation within the company. In other words, outside directors 
working from the platform of a sustainability committee may prove 
influential in urging the company to “gear up” for sustainability 
initiatives.54 
                                                 
50 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
51 Bates & Leclerc, supra note 49, at 16. 
52 Id. (noting the synergistic potential of membership on a board-level risk 
management committee). 
53 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:  Law, 
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 797, 801-03 (2001) (articulating the three well-recognized board functions: 
monitoring, legitimizing, and advising). 
54 This wonderful metaphor derives from the automotive industry: 
The framework’s first gear denotes compliance. In this first stage, a 
firm views the business case for sustainability with skepticism and, 
aside from generic corporate philanthropy, does little beyond comply 
with applicable labor and environmental regulations. In second gear, 
firms voluntarily move beyond mere compliance, view sustainability as 
legitimate though mostly a public-relations matter, and focus their 
efforts on “eco-efficiency” and “measuring, managing, and reducing” 
the direct impact of their operations. Companies that shift into third 
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Fourth, sustainability committees might serve to create a ripple effect–
when a director is appointed to such a committee at Company A, and 
embraces its mission, she soon may become a champion of sustainability 
at Companies B, C, and D. Betsy Atkins may be one such example. She 
currently sits on the boards of four public companies.55 She recently wrote 
a first-person commentary arguing that “[i]t has become obvious to every 
board member today that environmental issues are now a factor in 
governance decisions.”56 She learned this lesson in her board service at 
SunPower Corp., a manufacturer of solar generating equipment.57 Perhaps 
now she will carry that message to Chico’s (apparel), Polycom 
(communications equipment), and Reynolds American (tobacco).58 
Of course, there also may be some downsides to the creation of a 
sustainability committee. Every additional committee increases the burden 
on directors and spreads ever more thinly the time they are likely to devote 
to their board duties. Creation of a special-purpose committee also may 
unburden directors who are not on the committee from thinking deeply, or 
at all, about the issues that are not in their immediate portfolio. 
Balkanizing the board, in other words, may make the majority of directors 
less rather than more attentive to sustainability issues. 
As a related matter, creating a sustainability committee may also form 
the basis for unwarranted confidence on the part of stakeholders that 
environmental matters are receiving adequate attention. Sustainability 
                                                                                                                         
gear are more proactive in their efforts, often partnering with the 
government as well as “suppliers, customers, and others in their 
industry” to innovate sustainable solutions together. By fourth gear, a 
firm has integrated sustainability principles into its strategy and 
business processes (starting with product or service development), 
putting the firm at a competitive advantage in its sector and at the same 
time creating value for all of its stakeholder groups. In the fifth and 
highest gear, companies redesign or “reengineer” their business 
models, financial institutions, and markets to root out underlying 
causes of nonsustainability at “macro” (planetary ecological limits), 
“meso” (human-consumption demands), and “micro” (industry and 
company) levels. To be sure, “for many people, most of the time, four 
gears is enough, but there are times when it is necessary to shift into 
fifth gear, or overdrive.” 
Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 993-94 (2009). 
55 Committee Composition, Betsy S. Atkins, Director, SUNPOWER, http://investors. 
sunpowercorp.com/committees.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
56 Betsy S. Atkins, How SunPower Builds “Green” Issues into its Corporate 
Governance, 18 CORP.. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 21 (2010).  
57 Id. 
58 Committee Composition, supra note 55. 
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committees, as in the case of BP, may lull stakeholders into a false sense 
of security.59 
 
III. WHAT MIGHT DRIVE THE CREATION OF MORE BOARD LEVEL              
SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES? 
 
Currently, only a handful of American companies have created board-
level sustainability committees.60 If there is to be a drumbeat for the 
creation of more board-level committees, it will have to start somewhere. 
Who or what is likely to be the catalyst for change?   
 
A. State and Federal Law, NYSE Listing Standards 
 
Under applicable state law, U.S. corporations (with exceptions for 
closely-held enterprises), must have a board of directors;61 committees are 
optional.62 Under federal law, public companies must have only a board-
level audit committee.63 As of July, 2011, they also will have to have a 
fully independent compensation committee.64 The New York Stock 
Exchange’s listing standards require that boards have not only an audit 
committee and a compensation committee, but also a nominating/ 
corporate governance committee (these are known collectively as the “big 
three”).65 Otherwise, the use of committees is optional. 
As a practical matter, state law is an unlikely driver for any change in 
this setup. Typically, state corporate laws are enabling, not directive, and 
Delaware is certainly unlikely to deviate from this approach. Federal 
statutory law, too, is an unlikely driver. With a few notable exceptions, 
U.S. federal law is aimed at disclosure and not at corporate governance 
details. Recall, for example, that when Congress attempted to micro-
manage some aspects of corporate governance in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Delaware legislators, judges, lawyers, and corporate leaders 
                                                 
59 See Robertson & Krauss, supra note 37. 
60 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
61 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2002). 
62 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25 (2002). 
63 SEC Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2010). 
64 Mary E. Alcock, et al., Not Just Financial Reform: Dodd-Frank’s Executive 
Compensation and Governance Requirements, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 5 
(2010).  
65 FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES § 4, available at http://www. 
nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. 
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famously rebelled.66 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, passed in July, 2010, does little to change this situation.67 
The New York Stock Exchange is an unlikely driver, as well. True, the 
Stock Exchange has mandated the “big three” committees for the boards 
of its listed companies, but beyond that, the NYSE insists that, when it 
comes to corporate governance practices, one size does not fit all.68 
Indeed, the NYSE has encouraged a great deal of experimentation through 
the use of company-specific corporate governance guidelines.69 As a 
competitor with NASDAQ, the Stock Exchange would have little to gain 
by further prescribing the organizational structure of companies whose 
listings it seeks. 
 
B. “Soft Law” and Norms 
 
Who or what else might drive the development of sustainability 
committees? What about the “best practices” community? Mainstream 
actors like the Council of Institutional Investors, CalPERS, and the 
Business Roundtable, and the for-profit advisors that make up the 
“corporate governance industry” 70 all support the use of the “big three” 
committees.71 They are unlikely, however, to agree on the need to create 
additional special-interest board-level committees.   
On the other hand, leading social investment funds like Domini or 
widely-followed indices like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index or the 
FTSE4Good Index might well add to their screening criteria the 
establishment of board-level sustainability committees. Recently, for 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 503 (Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steel makes the case 
against Sarbanes-Oxley from Delaware’s perspective). 
67 See Paul Rose, Regulating Risk by ‘Strengthening Corporate Governance’ 1, 25-
26  (June 25, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630122 (arguing that the major corporate 
governance mandates in the bill do little to change the status quo of corporate 
governance) . 
68 FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES, supra note 65, at § 9 (“No single 
set of guidelines would be appropriate for every company ….”). 
69 Id. 
70 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 896 
(2007). 
71 See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
§ 2.5 (“Companies should have audit, nominating and compensation committees, and all 
members of these committees should be independent.”); CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES 
OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE III.B.2 § 1.8 (2010) (“Independent Board 
Committees: Committees who perform the audit, director nomination and executive 
compensation functions should consist entirely of independent directors.”); BUSINESS 
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § III (2010). 
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example, CERES recommended that some financial institutions elevate 
consideration of climate change issues to the board level.72 Others could 
follow CERES’s lead. 
 
C. Shareholder Demand 
 
Still other possible drivers for governance change might surface, on a 
corporation-specific basis. First, shareholders of individual companies 
may advance shareholder proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8, as they did in 
the cases of Apple and Intel.73 Similar proposals advancing sustainability 
goals by means of systematic reporting, specific project objectives, and 
adherence to the standards of groups such as the Forest Stewardship 
Council are now commonplace during proxy season, though rarely 
successful.74 Second, it is now possible for shareholders not only to 
advance advisory proposals under Rule 14a-8 but also to advance binding 
by-law amendments.75   
Third, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers may use their leverage in settling 
securities class actions to impose governance changes, including the 
creation of new board-level committees, as one of the terms of a class 
action settlement.76 These kinds of settlements are attractive both to 
corporate leaders (who must do little to change their behavior) and also to 
plaintiffs’ lawyers (who are ensured the recovery of a fee).   
 
                                                 
72 See DOUG COGAN, MEGAN GOOD & EMILY MCATEER, CERES, ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE RISK: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGING MARKETS: A BEST PRACTICES 
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=496. 
73 See supra notes 41 and 44 and accompanying text. 
74 Rule 14a-8 has recently been used to promote sustainability goals at: SunTrust 
Banks, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 59-60 (Mar. 5, 2010); PPG Industries, Inc., 
PPG Industries, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 10-11 (Mar. 5, 2010); EOG 
Resources, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 61-62 (Mar. 25, 2010); Tyson Foods, 
Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 21-23 (Dec. 22, 2009), ONEOK, Inc., Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A) 42-43 (Mar. 28, 2008); Kimberly-Clark Corp., Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A) 48-50 (Mar. 14, 2007); and Kroger Co., Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A) 43-44 (May 15, 2006), among others. There have been many shareholder 
proposals advocating enhanced environmental disclosure. 
75 See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 
123 (2d Cir. 2006). 
76 See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2010) (identifying the specific terms of recent securities class action 
settlements); Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics, supra note 1, at n.2 (enumerating 
examples of governance changes extracted by plaintiffs’ lawyers in class action 
settlements). 
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D. Negotiated Regulation Resulting from Civil and Criminal Enforcement 
Proceedings 
 
Plaintiffs’ class action lawyers are not the only advocates who can 
demand alterations in corporate governance practices. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission has also used its powers to create new board-level 
committees when settling civil enforcement actions.77 Presumably, the 
Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Justice could also 
extract such governance changes in settling lawsuits arising out of 
violation of the environmental laws.78 
 
E. Norm Entrepreneurs 
 
Finally, some corporations may be influenced by the personal 
preferences and initiatives of a powerful CEO. Charles O. “Chad” 
Holliday was such a leader. As chairman and CEO of the chemical giant 
DuPont from 1998-2009,79 Holliday also chaired the Business 
Roundtable’s Task Force on Environment, Technology, and Economy.80 
He co-authored the book Walking the Talk, which advocates social 
responsibility and environmental stewardship by major industrial 
companies.81 He is credited with “transforming DuPont from a fossil fuels 
and chemical company to a science company, delivering sustainable 
solutions that help others reduce their environmental footprints.”82 
                                                 
77 See Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics, supra note 1, at 795-96 (detailing the terms 
of SEC settlements requiring changes in corporate governance practices and establishing 
the creation of new board-level committees). 
78 See Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap: DPAs, NPAs 
and the Environmental Criminal Case, ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 7, 9 
(2010), available at http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/4307e686-a055-41ca-
9150-b2ccf d550365/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/83ca143f-8819-4478-8422-
b8203 40fa10d/ CMJ1002-Block_Feinberg.pdf. 
79 DuPont’s Board of Directors Appoints Ellen Kullman Chair, News Releases, 
DUPONT (Oct. 30, 2009), http://onlinepressroom.net/DuPont/NewsReleases/ (“Charles O. 
Holliday, Jr., 61, Chair, will retire from the board after 11 years as its chair-
man….Holliday served as DuPont’s CEO for 10 years.”). 
80 Business Roundtable Companies to Empower 10 Million Employees with 
Information on how to Save Energy, Recent News, SEE CHANGE (Dec. 13, 2006), http:// 
see change.businessroundtable.org/News/Read.aspx?ID=9. 
81 See generally CHAD HOLLIDAY, STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, & SIR PHILIP WATTS, 
WALKING THE TALK: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002) 
(discussing the business case for sustainable development). 
82 Chad Holliday Receives Courage to Lead Award, DUPONT NEWS, Nov. 13, 2009, 
http://www2.dupont.com/Media_Center/en_US/daily_news/november/article20091113. 
html. 
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Throughout his tenure as CEO, his board included an Environmental 
Policy Committee.83 
There is a lesson here. At the end of the day, a commitment to 
sustainability, with or without the creation of sustainability committees, is 
unlikely to be achieved merely because shareholders or stakeholders want 
it. Rather, as in all governance matters, this commitment is likely to 
depend on the “moral conscience and self-interest of corporations’ 
leaders.”84 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is, of course, nothing magically transformative about the 
creation of a board-level sustainability committee. Cosmetic committees 
that sound good, but achieve little, litter the corporate landscape. 
Still, the mini-trend that we can now observe, with the embrace by a 
few U.S. companies of new language, new board-level commitments, and 
new corporate structures, may be a leading indicator (a “green shoot”) of 
things to come. As the sample size grows, it will be useful to see if 
companies that have adopted board-level sustainability committees 
outperform their peers either in sustainability performance or financial 
performance. It will also be intriguing to see if, over the next decade, these 
committees proliferate or evaporate.  
                                                 
83 BUSINESS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: MOVING YOUR 
COMPANY TOWARD CLIMATE LEADERSHIP 11 (2007), available at http://www.bsr.org 
/reports/BSR_Beyond-Neutrality.pdf. 
84 See Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 671 (2009). 
